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Foreword
armed violence is an everyday reality for millions of people around the 
globe. more than 700 000 people die as a result of armed violence each year. 
many more experience traumatic loss in their families and are left with last-
ing psychological and physical scars. the impact of armed violence extends 
further, negatively influencing development, peace and good governance, 
often by creating a climate of impunity, corruption and by undermining 
public institutions. it is also closely tied with transnational crime and the 
misery and abuse associated with the illegal trafficking of arms, drugs and 
people. finally, the economic impact of armed violence is striking with the 
cost of lost productivity due to non-conflict armed violence alone estimated 
to cost upwards of uSd 95 billion annually worldwide. this violence has 
important youth and gender dimensions. the majority of perpetrators and 
victims are men, while women and girls are at greater risk of violence that is 
less visible and committed in the private sphere, including intimate partner 
violence, child abuse, sexual and gender based violence. measures at reduc-
ing armed violence are therefore also measures at reducing human suffering.
the oecd dac policy paper Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling 
Development, published in 2009, acknowledged as a challenge the increased 
levels of armed violence in non-conflict countries, the increasing linkage 
between conflict and crime, rapidly growing youth populations in the south 
and accelerating levels of unregulated urbanisation. the paper provided a 
methodology to help donors tackle the programming challenging of reducing 
armed violence. Building on the oecd dac policy paper, three program-
ming notes were developed to contribute to our understanding of specific 
types of armed violence: Youth and armed violence, armed violence in 
urban areas and Security System Reform in relation to Armed violence 
reduction. each note aims to improve our understanding of these dynamics 
while also offering practical assistance on assessments, programme design, 
risk management, monitoring and evaluation, as well as on entry points for 
direct and indirect programming.
2011 is an important year for global efforts at armed violence reduc-
tion with a series of regional best practice seminars as well as the high-level 
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conference on armed violence reduction in the context of the geneva dec-
laration on armed violence and development, scheduled for october 2011. i 
strongly encourage the use of these programming notes to strengthen our 
understanding of these critical development issues and to support new inno-
vative programmatic guidelines for armed violence reduction.
Jordan ryan 
assistant administrator and 
director, Bureau for crisis Prevention and recovery 
united nations development Programme
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OECD Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) 
programming notes
approximately 740 000 people die as a result of armed violence each 
year. armed violence erodes governance and peace whilst slowing down 
achievement of the millennium development goals (mdg’s). it can have as 
significant an effect on security and development in settings of chronic vio-
lent crime and inter-personal violence as it can in societies affected by war 
or civil conflict. an armed violence agenda therefore includes a wide range 
of countries, cities and citizens whose development and security are under 
threat. it refers to the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death 
or psychosocial harm.
to help desk officers and conflict/fragility experts who are working to tackle 
the problem of armed violence, oecd development assistance committee 
(dac) members have requested three Armed Violence Reduction (AVR) 
Programming Notes to build on the oecd dac policy paper on Armed Violence 
Reduction: Enabling Development (oecd, 2009). the three notes cover:
•	 Armed violence in urban areas: the majority of the world’s popula-
tion now lives in urban centres. as economic transformations accel-
erate rural-urban migration, the rural poor are being converted into 
an urban poor who populate mega-slums on the periphery of major 
urban centres. more and more of these areas are afflicted by high 
levels of armed violence.
•	 Youth and armed violence: the largest-ever generation of young 
people is now entering adulthood. almost half of the world’s popula-
tion is under the age of 24 and the vast majority of 10-24 year olds 
live in less developed countries. youth are particularly at risk of 
being exposed to and engaging in, armed violence and crime.
•	 AVR and Security System Reform (SSr): aVr and SSr have similar 
objectives and are mutually reinforcing. But they also have their dis-
tinct methods, entry points and comparative advantages. it is important 
to understand the linkages between the two approaches in order to 
maximise the impact of public safety and security interventions.
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to ensure an effective response to armed violence, the programming 
notes use an armed violence “lens”, which was developed in Armed Violence 
Reduction: Enabling Development. the lens helps practitioners consider the 
key elements shaping armed violence patterns. these include the people 
affected by armed violence, the perpetrators and their motivations, the avail-
ability of instruments (arms) and the wider institutional/cultural environ-
ment that enables and/or protects against armed violence. the lens highlights 
risk factors associated with armed violence and their vertical linkages from the 
local to the global level. it encourages practitioners to think outside specific 
sector mandates and provides practical entry points for aVr programming.
armed violence prevention and reduction are feasible but require sig-
nificant leadership by affected states and investment of financial resources by 
development partners. they also require the ability to engage with non-state 
and sub-national actors. finally, evidence suggests that effective interventions 
need a good evidence base, participatory assessments and the simultaneous 
engagement in multiple sectors (reflecting the broad range of interrelated issues 
and actors involved), at multiple levels (local, national, regional and global) and 
over a longer time horizon.
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Introduction
Security System reform (SSr1) and armed Violence reduction (aVr) 
share the same objective: to contribute to stability, safety and security as an 
enabling environment for development. as such, “SSr and aVr are highly 
complementary and mutually reinforcing” (oecd, 2009, p. 111). Building 
on the recent oecd policy paper, Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling 
Development (2009), this note describes how the linkages between aVr 
and SSr programming can be used effectively in programme design and 
implementation for donors, policy makers and practitioners, as well as pro-
gramme managers, practitioners and civil society staff at headquarters and 
in the field.
this topic falls under the umbrella of the oecd dac’s international 
network on conflict and fragility (incaf), which aims to advise donors 
on how best to assist countries in preventing or recovering from conflict 
and fragility. Both aVr and SSr are key policy and programmatic building 
blocks in helping to build peaceful states and viable state institutions in post 
conflict and fragile settings. in this sense aVr and SSr form a critical part 
of the reform agenda in post conflict and fragile settings. Both aVr and SSr 
can be seen as core areas of reform that help bridge the security-development 
nexus and also help to operationalise the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
narrative.
this programming note gives guidance to those seeking to reinforce 
programmes by utilising the linkages between aVr and SSr in cases where 
it has been calculated that such synergy would enhance impact. attention is 
given to aVr topics and programming options that offer relevant ways to 
improve the service delivery of security and justice bodies, which are not 
(sufficiently) addressed within current SSr programmes as detailed in the 
OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007). Likewise, the note 
also points out ways in which aVr projects can be complemented by concur-
rent SSr operations. the approaches are illustrated by examples from the 
field demonstrating how and why the aVr-SSr synergy has proven useful 
in particular settings.
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the structure of the paper is as follows:
•	 chapter 1 provides a concise discussion of the concepts of SSR and 
AVR and a brief overview of the linkages between the two.
•	 chapter 2 starts at the beginning of the programming cycle by focus-
ing on assessment and design, specifically using the armed Violence 
(aV) lens and innovative assessment techniques to underscore how 
they can help fine-tune SSr programme planning.
•	 chapter 3 introduces two programmatic approaches that can help 
promote positive synergies between aVr and SSr. the first discusses 
how SSr programming can adopt an aVr emphasis. the second dis-
cusses ways to ensure that aVr and SSr programmes and activities 
complement each other.
•	 chapter 4 describes entry points for programming. it gives examples 
of how the existence of an SSr programme can facilitate the introduc-
tion of aVr and vice versa.
•	 chapter 5 concludes the programming note with a brief description of 
the different aVr and SSr approaches to monitoring and evaluation. 
Specific consideration is given to indicator design and involvement of 
local stakeholders.
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Chapter 1 
 
The concepts of Security System Reform and 
Armed Violence Reduction
Security System Reform
“Security System reform is another term used to describe the transfor-
mation of the ’security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, 
responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the 
system” (oecd, 2005, p. 20). SSr programming aims to support countries in 
the development of more effective, efficient and accountable security and jus-
tice systems, which are better able to meet the justice and security needs of its 
citizens in “a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles 
of governance and the rule of law” (oecd, 2005; oecd, 2007). By carefully 
identifying the security needs of the people in a society – including women, 
men, boys, girls, minorities, vulnerable groups etc. – and what is required to 
meet those needs, an SSr programme can be designed to improve the ability 
of the security system to provide security services. as such, the concept of 
SSr emphasises a people-centred approach. its method for achieving security 
of the population is to improve the capacity and accountability of security 
institutions and bodies.
the security system is comprised of nine sub-sectors (oecd, 2007): 
accountability and oversight; defence; intelligence and security service; 
integrated border management; police; justice; private security and military 
companies; and civil society. certain sectors may be targeted for reform 
based on the needs identified within the specific context or as entry points 
for wider reform. yet it is important to remember that the sectors form a 
holistic system. as such, reform in one sector needs to take into account the 
effects of insufficiencies in other sectors and the impact of reforms on related 
sectors as well. thus, collaboration between sectors is fundamental and the 
concept of SSr is holistic in its approach to design and implementation of 
programming.2
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Armed Violence Reduction
increasingly, it is being recognised that armed violence has a profound 
negative effect on (human) development (united nations Secretary general 
(unSg), 2009; oecd, 2009; geneva declaration, 2006; geneva declaration, 
2008). armed violence is broadly defined as: “the use or threatened use of 
weapons to inflict injury, death or psychosocial harm, which undermines devel-
opment” (oecd, 2009, p. 21). this includes interpersonal violence such as 
violent crime and collective violence such as armed conflict, gang violence, or 
forms of organised crime. aVr programmes focus on reducing armed violence 
by integrating “developmental and preventative programmes with more effec-
tive law enforcement and diplomatic/political efforts” (oecd, 2009, p. 22).
aVr programming targets risk and protective factors that appear to 
increase or reduce the likelihood of armed violence. for example, a large 
presence of arms in a community can be a risk factor for armed violence, 
whereas an attitude or culture within a society that challenges the use of fire-
arms can be a protective factor. these factors are identified through rigorous 
analyses of data drawn from epidemiological and other quantitative as well 
as qualitative methods, which assemble information on types and levels of 
armed violence. in addition, the “armed violence lens” helps capture key fea-
tures of armed violence that can increase practitioners’ awareness of context-
specific drivers, risk factors, protective factors and effects of armed violence 
(oecd, 2009, p. 49). its application in assessments helps create a rich picture 
of the various elements of armed violence: the people it affects; the perpe-
trators; the instruments with which it is perpetrated; and the institutions 
that influence it; as well as its local, national, regional and global dimensions.
aVr programmes address the causes and effects of armed violence at 
different levels: at international and national levels – the institutional actors 
and legal frameworks managing and governing the use of armed violence 
– as well as at the local community and individual level. aVr programmes 
often seek to establish security as defined by ordinary citizens, since the 
local and sub-national level is where armed violence is experienced most 
directly. in doing this, aVr explicitly recognises that citizens’ perceptions 
of security are not necessarily uniform: men and women, people of differ-
ent ages, social or ethnic backgrounds may have different perceptions of 
security needs. as such, aVr programmes are closely linked to community 
security programmes. aVr programmes seek to increase security through 
direct programmes that specifically target the reduction and prevention of 
armed violence and its effects, as well as indirect programmes that involve 
development programming that mainstream aVr elements so that program-
ming is aVr-sensitive and includes aVr sub-goals (oecd, 2009, p. 86-87). 
for example, direct programming targets factors contributing to the use of 
armed violence such as Small arms and Light weapons (SaLw). indirect 
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Box 1.1. A common denominator in SSR and AVR: The importance of gender
the mutual aim to be people-centred represents a strong link between SSr and aVr. tuning 
security programmes to the needs of citizens requires recognising that these needs, like 
communities, are not homogenous. Security and armed violence are highly gendered: men, 
women, boys and girls3 contribute to and experience violence and insecurity in different 
ways. this understanding is made explicit in both aVr and SSr literature: unequal access 
to security and justice services, normalisation of gender-based violence and imbalanced 
representation within security forces are seen as corollaries of gender disparities that shape 
the security realities of men and women, boys and girls differently. therefore, at each point 
within programming, security practitioners should consider the particular experiences of men 
and women, as well as the role that gender relations and norms play in enabling or reducing 
violence. including such a perspective not only enhances programmes’ efficacy and reach, but 
can furthermore work to address some of the systemic sources of insecurity.
Specific guidance for mainstreaming gender in programmes can be drawn from both aVr 
and SSr approaches. one common aim is to gather accurate perspectives of men and women, 
boys and girls and integrating those particular views into programming. this necessarily 
involves considering and accommodating for social and practical barriers (e.g. restricted 
mobility; public participation; literacy) that may restrict men or women from participating in 
assessments, monitoring and evaluation surveys. it also requires collecting sex-disaggregated 
data and striving to maintain gender balance in (participatory) surveys. application of the aV 
lens in (SSr) assessments can assist in highlighting the specific factors that increase men and 
women’s likelihood of becoming a target and/or perpetrator of violence, as well as their spe-
cific roles in formal and informal institutions that enable or reduce the use of armed violence. 
it can also help to highlight barriers that prevent the recruitment, integration and promotion 
of women in the security bodies – an aim of SSr programmes.
this type of analysis can be used to appropriately target programming responses and monitor 
the effects of programmes for men and women. moreover, analysis of gender-sensitive data 
can help programmers design and further develop indicators that reflect men and women’s 
distinct perceptions and experiences of (in)security. in turn, this can inspire new approaches 
or reveal valuable entry points for programmers to co-operate with local actors in address-
ing locally-defined aspects of (in)security that stem from gender norms and relations, such 
as violent masculinity or unequal participation in (oversight of) security forces. in this way, 
including gender perspectives allows for more precisely tailored security programmes that 
meet people’s expectations and needs.
for further reference see: Bastic, m. (2008), Integrating Gender in Post-Conflict Security Sector 
Reform, Policy Paper No.29, dcaf (geneva centre for democratic control of armed forces), 
geneva.; Valasek, k. (2008), “Security Sector reform and gender”, Gender and Security Sector 
Reform Toolkit, dcaf, geneva.; and: kristen, a. (2007), Guns and Roses: Gender and Armed 
Violence in Africa, undP (united nations development Programme), geneva.
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programming targets more general protective and risk factors for armed vio-
lence, which can include urban renewal schemes and street lighting projects.
Conceptual synergies between AVR and SSR
the ultimate objective of both SSr and aVr is to contribute to a safe, 
stable and secure environment in which development can take place. as such, 
they are mutually complementary programming strategies. However, each 
Box 1.2. Complementarities of AVR and SSR: The justice sector
aVr and SSr both incorporate a focus on justice as an important component for reducing 
violent conflict, armed violence and enhancing crime prevention – all of which are condi-
tions for a stable, conducive environment for development. Both assert that the justice sector 
is instrumental for people’s security. that said, both approaches have slightly different, but 
complementary, perspectives on how justice contributes to security.
for SSr, building legitimate, democratic judicial institutions, which subscribe to interna-
tional human rights standards is fundamental and must be addressed in a comprehensive 
manner (oecd, 2007, p. 182). in addition, the justice sector is vital for effective SSr because 
it is directly linked to successful service delivery in many other security sectors, in particular 
police and prisons. aVr on the other hand, draws attention to how criminal justice reform 
– improving the capacity to detect, investigate, adjudicate and sentence criminal offences – 
may be connected with indirect security provision such as community centres that counsel 
at-risk youth or provide sports and music clubs as an alternative to joining gangs. as such, 
indirect aVr programming is able to reinforce some core activities of SSr (such as reforming 
juvenile detention centres or strengthening police presence in gang epicentres) and, thereby, 
enhance whole-of-government approaches (oecd, 2009, p. 51).
moreover, formal and informal justice mechanisms are seen as an important part of the risk 
and protective factors for armed violence that can be targeted in aVr programming. SSr 
equally recognises the importance of both formal and informal mechanisms for the justice 
sector and the need to address both in programming. applying both aVr and SSr perspec-
tives encourages attention to how justice is provided through both formal and informal 
arrangements, the possible tensions between them and their impact on other components of 
security. furthermore, each perspective offers insight into the array of justice mechanisms 
that security programmers can support when tailoring a programme to a specific context.
Since both aVr and SSr accrue importance to the justice sector, and, taken together, recog-
nise the several ways in which it links with security, it is an area where there is a great need 
as well as opportunity to ensure complementarity and to avoid duplication and gaps. Justice 
is therefore one of the sectors where synergies, in terms of entry points, sequencing and 
complementary programming, can greatly enhance the effectiveness of both programmes.
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programme has its own specific methods to reach this common objective, 
which implies that each has a comparative advantage. the most effective 
synergies can be found where each approach can employ its strengths while 
being complemented by the other. in other words, when thinking about the 
opportunities for effective synergies between aVr and SSr, it is important 
to consider the added value and comparative advantage of each approach.
SSr focuses on building an effective, efficient and accountable security 
system that meets people’s security and justice needs in order to contribute 
to an environment in which people feel safe. this necessitates due atten-
tion to differing security needs of, for instance, men and women as well as 
vulnerable ethnic and social groups. yet, although the concept of SSr pro-
motes a people-centred and holistic approach, SSr practice mostly focuses 
on enhancing the ability of the state to meet a range of security and justice 
challenges and needs through the mechanisms and instruments at its disposal 
(oecd, 2007, p. 21; oecd, 2005, p. 1). SSr programmes are typically car-
ried out as purely technical enterprises (rathmell, 2009), in that they concen-
trate on improving operations capacities and mostly use a “train and equip” 
method. as such, the people-centred approach of SSr is often not operation-
alised and while attention has been focused on pursuing holistic SSr, this 
has proven very difficult to put into practice. However, SSr offers a clear and 
well-developed set of guidelines and tools for,4 as well as practical experience 
in, strengthening the capacity of security institutions and oversight bodies,5 
and this is where its comparative advantage lies.
aVr is broader in scope than SSr, as it “aims to reduce the risks and 
effects of armed violence” (oecd, 2009, p. 22). aVr programming addresses 
contextual factors of security, such as socio-economic development and com-
munity coherence. thus aVr is able to target risk and protective factors at all 
levels (from international to local). as such it can include a focus on improv-
ing the capacity of state institutions – such as ministries of health, education 
or internal affairs – as well as legal reform to deal with armed violence.6 
However, given aVr’s explicit emphasis on establishing security at the local 
level including community security, its comparative strength lies in its ability 
to drive bottom-up or top-down (for instance strengthening national firearms 
control regimes) interventions grounded in good contextual understanding 
and on the basis of a developmental and local approach. recognising that local 
communities are not homogeneous, the aVr approach advocates for the dif-
ferentiation between the security needs of various social groups and provides 
examples of how to break data down on the bases of, for example, gender, 
social status and identity traits.
By drawing on the comparative advantages, the two approaches can 
mutually reinforce each other. there may even be overlaps – for example, it is 
easily recognised that SSr (by improving the capacity of security bodies) can 
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reduce risk factors for armed violence. However, this does not mean that SSr 
and aVr programmes should be merged. Blurring the distinction between 
programmes will make it more difficult to identify clear programming tasks 
and thereby risks increasing co-ordination problems.
instead, effective linkages can be found by carefully assessing which 
programmatic approach, or what combination or sequence of the two, is most 
suited to address particular justice and security needs. for example, as was 
pointed out above, the comparative strength of aVr lies in its grassroots, 
developmental and locally focused approach that often remains underdevel-
oped in SSr practice. By complementing SSr with the grassroots compo-
nents of aVr, programming can become more people-centred and locally 
responsive, which could increase the programmes’ efficacy and sustainability. 
Similarly, SSr has the potential to yield national level impacts through com-
prehensive and integrated reforms of the security system, which can contrib-
ute to stronger aVr programmes by scaling them up into SSr’s institutional 
reform of security bodies.
in general terms, the aVr approach can help fine-tune SSr interventions 
and enhance effectiveness by highlighting local, people-centred security 
issues and proposing innovative means to address them; aVr can serve as 
an entry point for dialogue on SSr (and vice versa); and SSr and aVr pro-
gramming are complementary (oecd, 2009, p. 111-112). the rest of this note 
elaborates these synergies in more detail, starting with assessment and design 
of programming (chapter 2), subsequently looking at practical program-
ming options (chapter 3), then turning to mutual SSr and aVr entry points 
(chapter 4) and finally discussing synergies in monitoring and evaluation 
(m&e) (chapter 5).
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Chapter 2 
 
Assessment and design
Both Security System reform and armed Violence reduction strongly 
advocate that diagnostic assessments of the local context are central to effec-
tive programme design, implementation and evaluation (oecd, 2007, p. 41; 
oecd, 2009, p. 60). SSr has a well-developed assessment methodology 
that is laid out in the oecd dac’s Handbook on Security System Reform 
– Supporting Security and Justice. it gives clear guidance for SSr assess-
ments in the different subsectors of the security system and advocates for the 
inclusion of people’s perceptions of security and security needs in SSr assess-
ments. aVr promotes the combined use of specialised methodologies and 
tools that bring critical elements contributing to armed violence to the fore. 
incorporating such an aVr focus in SSr assessments can help refine, enhance 
and refocus SSr towards its people-centeredness.7 incorporating an aVr 
perspective in SSr assessments can highlight which approach or combination 
of approaches is most likely to generate positive results. additionally, an aVr 
focus in SSr assessments can assist in creating programmes that are more rel-
evant to the specific needs of partner countries (in particular at the community 
level) and, thereby, are better received by its affected population. community 
members are more likely to support activities they see as responding to their 
articulated concerns (oecd, 2005, p. 66), which can enable programmes to 
garner the local “buy in” that eludes many donor-driven SSr activities.
there are two ways in which an aVr perspective can be included in SSr 
assessments: (1) by applying the armed Violence lens; and (2) by applying 
the specialised methodologies and tools aVr advocates.
Applying the armed violence lens in SSR assessments
the armed violence (aV) lens helps structure analyses according to 
people, perpetrators, instruments and institutions that influence levels of 
armed violence.
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•	 the people component of the aV lens is primarily guided by the 
question: “what is needed to make individuals and communities 
feel safe and secure in the particular contexts in which they live?” 
(oecd, 2009, p. 51). this includes attention to the diverse percep-
tions of security needs that the different groups (gender, age, social 
identity) within these communities may have. including this com-
ponent in SSr assessments can help ensure an accurate picture of 
micro-level security needs of women and men as well as other groups 
and re-emphasise a people-centred SSr approach.
•	 the perpetrator component of the aV lens focuses on mapping the 
motivations (socio-economic, social status and identity, cultural fac-
tors, political identity and group status) of perpetrators and the ways 
in which they are organised by disaggregating data by gender, age, 
location and ethnicity (oecd, 2009, p. 53) (Box 2.1). SSr assess-
ments – focusing heavily on security needs and institutional capac-
ity – often give little explicit attention to the role of perpetrators. 
yet, this information can help fine tune SSr assessments in order to 
effectively address perpetrators and contextual causes of insecurity.
•	 the instruments component of the aV lens draws attention to the 
supply and availability of weapons and ammunition, which pose a 
risk factor for armed violence. it also includes a focus on the demand 
Box 2.1. Viva Rio in Haiti: How an AVR assessment revealed incentives for 
reducing violence
What works: the tambou Lapè programme focused on reducing violence in Bel air, an area 
in the centre of Haiti’s capital Port au Prince. through a process of extensive consultations 
with community members, the ngo Viva rio found out, among other things, that both com-
munity members and gang leaders had vested interests in educating their local youth. this 
prompted an initiative that used collective incentives to reduce violence by introducing schol-
arship lotteries in communities that achieved concrete reductions in violence within specific 
timelines and neighbourhoods as part of tambou Lapè programme.
Why it works: investing time and resources into participatory assessments enabled Viva rio 
to capitalise on local protection factors. a focus on the people and the perpetrators helped to 
reveal issues concerning the role of gangs in the community, their motivations and the reputa-
tion they maintained as both predatory and protective actors. this information then provided 
starting points for the design of activities directly linked to the common social concerns of 
both the community and gangs, and allowed setting concrete parameters on which to base 
indicators and benchmarks.
Source: Viva rio (2009), Honour and Respect for Bel Air, annual report 2008, Haiti.
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factors that drive people to acquire or retain weapons (Box 2.2). 
in order to create an effective, efficient and accountable security 
system, SSr assessments need to include a focus on the capacity of 
the sub-sectors and the system as a whole to effectively deal with the 
prevalence of instruments of violence.
•	 the institutions component of the aV lens distinguishes between 
the formal and informal institutions that regulate and control the use 
of armed violence. SSr focuses primarily on the formal institutions 
i.e. those bodies and actors, state or non-state, delivering security and 
justice services. the informal institutions are the social and cultural 
practices, norms and values that organise social behaviour and form 
the rules of the game for armed violence.
in particular, application of the aV lens in assessments of the sub-sectors 
of the security system emphasises and highlights important issues that would 
be underemphasised or overlooked in regular SSr assessments. table 2.1. 
lists aspects that are (re-)emphasised when the aV lens is incorporated in 
SSr assessments, per sub-sector of the security system.
Box 2.2. SALW assessment in Burundi: A focus on people, perpetrators, 
instruments and institutions
What works: a community-level assessment done in Burundi sought to provide valuable 
information regarding the impact of the presence of weapons in a community, citizens’ 
motivations for obtaining weapons initially and for retaining them despite disarmament cam-
paigns. it was revealed, for instance, that people characterised insecurity brought about by 
weapon ownership as a disintegration of community trust. Popular perceptions of weapons, 
weapon owners and disarmament campaigns were also discussed. Perpetrators were often 
identified as former combatants who failed to reintegrate and turned to armed crime or mer-
cenary work as an economic recourse. instruments were often obtained to commit crimes 
or resolve disputes, but rarely for personal protection. the instruments could be hired out, 
illustrating the degree to which criminal weapons possession had been (informally) insti-
tutionalised. and the implication of the police and army in the lending of weapons further 
demonstrated the involvement of formal institutions.
Why it works: all of the information gathered in the community assessment is essential 
for focusing disarmament campaigns on the appropriate risk and resilience factors within 
the given context, thereby showing options for specifically targeting those factors that could 
strengthen the local community disarmament strategy.
Source: forbes, a. (2007), Rapid Assessments of the Impact and Perceptions of Small Arms in the 
Burundi Interior, danchurchaid and conseil national des eglises du Burundi.
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table 2.1. Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR 
assessments and programme design
Sector People Perpetrators Instruments Institutions
Accountability 
and oversight
Capacity of civilian 
oversight committees 
and civil society over-
sight; decentralised 
accountability struc-
tures for all sectors 
of SSR; mechanisms 
which enable public 
complaint reporting 
Criminal collusion with 
security and justice 
actors; corruption and 
immunity undermining 
the rule of law 
Legislation on public 
gun ownership; 
regulation and tracking 
measures for legally 
purchased weapons 
Informal or traditional 
mechanisms of over-
sight; local cultural 
systems of accountabil-
ity; local perceptions 
of legitimacy and how 
to establish it; impunity 
undermining the rule 
of law
Defence reform Perceived threats from 
military forces; percep-
tions of disarmament, 
demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR) 
programme beneficiar-
ies; community needs 
for accepting DDR 
beneficiaries 
Human rights abuse 
within military ranks; 
unemployed ex-com-
batants; ex-combatants 
excluded from DDR; 
incentives for disar-
mament; DDR pro-
grammes for vulnerable 
groups, in particular 
women and children
Capacity in effective 
stockpile management; 
capacity for manage-
ment of de-issued arms 
(in DDR programmes); 
(ex) combatants’ 
use and perception 
of weapons after 
discharge
Military role in internal 
(in)security; resistance 
to budget cutting of 
military; corruption 
and abuse of power 
within military; legal 
framework for defence 
forces role in providing 
security
Intelligence and 
security
Respecting human 
rights standards while 
engaging with citizens 
to gain local insights 
valuable to security; 
identifying trends of 
violence that exces-
sively affect certain 
groups (including a 
focus on gender based 
violence [GBV])
Human rights abuses 
by intelligence service 
and security forces
Capacity to collect and 
analyse intelligence 
on weapons trade and 
weapons presence; 
responsibly sourcing 
the knowledge of men 
and women about 
weapon depots, hidden 
caches, trade routes 
etc.
Capacity and legal 
framework for intel-
ligence and security 
forces
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Sector People Perpetrators Instruments Institutions
Integrated 
border 
management
Patterns of human 
trafficking; patterns of 
streams of refugees or 
victims of armed vio-
lence; patterns of influx 
of migration leading to 
chaotic urbanisation
Capacity to address 
trans-national crime 
syndicates; violence 
motivated by control 
of ports and border 
territories; unregulated 
passage of perpetrators 
across borders 
Capacity to control 
weapons import and 
export; capacity for 
stockpile management 
of border management 
forces
Legal frameworks 
governing border man-
agement and migra-
tion departments and 
agencies; relations with 
neighbouring countries; 
corruption and collu-
sion of border guards; 
capacity for addressing 
human trafficking
Police Relations between 
police and societal 
groups (e.g. men, 
women, youths, 
minorities); decentral-
ised mechanisms of 
accountability; level of 
responsiveness and 
capacity to respond 
to local concerns; 
capacity to provide 
assistance to victims, 
including specialised 
procedures for assist-
ing victims of GBV; 
public expectations of 
security provision
(History of) human 
rights abuses within 
police ranks; criminal 
collusion or infiltration 
of police; level of police 
knowledge of perpetra-
tors’ motives, strate-
gies; specialised tactics 
to address motivations 
and violent behaviour 
of perpetrators; level of 
police knowledge and 
capacity to deal with 
perpetrators of GBV
Capacity to track and 
manage weapons 
issued to police; capac-
ity to enforce public 
arm regulations and 
laws; use of force train-
ing; weapons training; 
capacity to manage dis-
armament programmes
State of facilities; 
capacity of organisa-
tional management; 
protection and promo-
tion of rule of law; 
human rights training; 
cultural attitudes 
regarding GBV; levels 
of corruption; existing 
local/informal security 
initiatives and links to 
formal structures
Justice Accessibility of courts; 
trust in the court 
system/level of “vigi-
lante justice”; personal 
security of judges, 
prosecutors and wit-
nesses; informal justice 
networks 
Corruption and “pur-
chasable” justice; 
“catch and release” 
pattern of criminals; 
prosecution of banditry, 
interpersonal offenses
Capacity to prosecute 
public arms violations; 
legal framework and 
penalties for illicit arms 
possession 
Legal framework for the 
protection of vulnerable 
groups’ rights (domes-
tic violence, GBV); 
impunity and corruption 
undermining rule of law; 
condition and function 
of facilities; informal 
justice institutions 
table 2.1. Issues (re-)emphasised when using the armed violence lens in SSR 
assessments and programme design (continued)
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Innovative assessment techniques
aVr recognises existing assessment methods, such as population-based 
surveys, stability and fragility assessments, conflict assessments, gender 
analysis and criminal justice and governance assessments but promotes com-
bining these existing tools and data sources, to uncover the likelihood for 
violence and factors that can be targeted in programming (oecd, 2009, p. 41, 
p. 61). among these methods, the public health approach for instance, offers 
a population-based analysis of the patterns, concentrations, risk factors and 
protective factors of armed violence. as in traditional epidemiology, which 
uses rigorous data collection techniques to map the causes and prevalence of 
a health risk within a population, public health approaches to armed violence 
Sector People Perpetrators Instruments Institutions
Prison Separate prisons for 
women, men, children; 
(dis)trust in prison 
security; rehabilitation 
of prisoners 
Human rights abuse by 
prison actors;
collusion of criminals 
and prison guards; 
corruption 
Availability of arms 
in prisons; stockpile 
management of confis-
cated weapons; prison 
personnel involvement 
in arms supplies
Integrity and security 
of facilities; corrup-
tion of prison guards; 
overcrowding leading to 
premature release
Private security 
and military 
companies 
(PSC/PMC)
Need for private security 
companies to fill gaps 
left by state security 
(security vacuum)
Human rights abuse by 
PSCs/PMCs, including 
sexual violence
Regulation of arms held 
by private security and 
military companies; 
demand factors for 
PSC/PMCs 
Legitimacy and per-
ceptions of need of 
companies; legal regu-
lation; legal authority 
to use force; conflict or 
co-operation with state 
forces
Civil society Public definitions of 
legitimate representa-
tion; belief in civil soci-
ety’s capacity to gauge, 
analyse and represent 
society’s needs and 
concerns and to moni-
tor risk factors 
Role of local power-
holders; issues of 
capture and collusion; 
capacity to monitor 
and represent victims 
of GBV
Knowledge of demand 
factors for weapons; 
knowledge of local 
perception of weapons; 
citizen movements or 
campaigns against 
arms; knowledge of 
sources and locations 
of arms
Integration of violence 
into local culture; 
regulatory framework 
for NGO operations; 
reputation of organisa-
tions within community 
and public institutions; 
groups’ legitimate 
representativeness, 
including representa-
tion of gender, age and 
minority groups 
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assessment aim to methodically deduce factors that increase or reduce the 
likelihood of violence, or the likelihood of a person becoming either a perpe-
trator or victim of violence (world Health organisation (wHo), 2009a). this 
information can be used to enhance preventative responses at multiple levels, 
such as state interventions (including SSr programmes), legislative policies, 
municipal and community-based initiatives.
However, such public health information is not always accessible or 
available – particularly in fragile contexts – and is typically labour-intensive 
and expensive to collect. in volatile environments, there is also a heightened 
risk of producing inaccurate results. the oecd armed Violence reduction 
policy paper provides examples of other innovative data sources and tools 
that can generate similarly detailed information, including geographic 
information Systems and technologies that enable the combination of mul-
tiple data sources – such as statistics collected by customs officials, police, 
development agencies – to help analyse patterns that may direct targeted 
responses (oecd, 2009, p. 69) (for an example from Haiti: kolbe and Hutson, 
2006).
Statistical data on trends such as incidents of crime, demographic devel-
opments or food prices, can track correlations between these events and the 
occurrence of violence, which may assist analysts in identifying and address-
ing risk factors.8 Similarly, disaggregating data by gender, age, ethnicity and/
or geography reveals any disproportionate effects of insecurity on certain 
Box 2.3. Types of security knowledge generated by the public health approach
the results of a public health approach include quantified measures of:
•	 What is happening: are particular types of violence (i.e. gun-shot, domestic abuse, 
rape, armed robbery, etc.) disproportionately prevalent?
•	 Where it is happening: are particular areas more or less prone to violent acts than 
others?
•	 To whom it is happening; are particular groups (women, men, girls, boys, ethnic groups, 
other minorities, etc.) more or less vulnerable to victimisation? Similarly, are particular 
groups more or less likely to become perpetrators?
•	 When it is happening: do certain seasons, dates, or hours of the day see a significant 
amount of violent incidents? are certain periods notably calm or less likely to be dis-
rupted by violence?
•	 How often it is happening: is the frequency of violence consistent enough to consti-
tute a trend?
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groups or concentrations of insecurity in particular locations. conversely, 
measures of where, when and to whom violence is not occurring can expose 
factors of local resilience and point to aspects that reduce the likelihood of 
violence.
if the quality of the data allows, SSr policy makers and programme 
coordinators can use population-based studies to design activities that are 
accurately based on local realities, aptly scaled and implemented at the 
appropriate level. for example, where the presence or absence of violence is 
localised, the aberration may indicate risk or resilience factors that are unique 
to a single community, and programming therefore may need to target this 
community in particular. By contrast, if certain trends are found consistently 
across several areas, this may signal systemic problems requiring effort to be 
channelled through more municipal or national reforms. rigorous statistical 
evidence also has leveraging power to mobilise political means of address-
ing patterns of insecurity. including statistical and public health experts in 
assessment teams may facilitate the generation and use of this type of data.9
Box 2.4. Sierra Leone: Sexual abuse as a weapon of war
What works: Physicians for Human rights (PHr) utilises the skills, expertise and credibil-
ity of health professionals in campaigning against Human rights violations. PHr conducted 
a comprehensive population-based study, assessing the prevalence and impact of sexual 
violence among internally displaced persons (idPs) in Sierra Leone. employing rigorous 
scientific methodology and sampling techniques, the PHr researchers could record accurate 
statistics and make reliable extrapolations to document the nature and pervasiveness of the 
abuses reported in the survey. the study revealed, among other things, characteristics of the 
perpetrators, assistance needs of the victims and indicated the systemic use of sexual abuse 
by revolutionary united front (ruf) soldiers as a weapon of war. their work, carried out 
with support from the united nations assistance mission in Sierra Leone (unamSiL) and 
local aides, produced a report that was used to convincingly advocate for the Special court 
on Sierra Leone and the truth and reconciliation commission to give priority attention and 
guarantee reparations to the victims of sexual violence.
Why it works: epidemiological assessments and population-based studies are designed to 
accurately depict the occurrence of particular threats within a wider context. collecting such 
information and presenting it in quantifiable terms can convey the distribution, outcomes and 
risk factors of violence. in Sierra Leone the study was made possible through the assistance 
of unamSiL, pre-existing population statistics and the existence of large idP camps. these 
factors facilitated both access and necessary conditions for proper sampling – two common 
obstacles to conducting epidemiological studies in (post-)conflict areas.
Source: thoms, o.n.t. and J. ron (2007), “Public health, conflict and human rights: toward a collabora-
tive research agenda”, Conflict and Health, Vol. 1, no. 11.
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gender analysis of peace and security strategies and programmes has 
received greater prominence in line with the united nations (un) Security 
council resolutions on women, peace and security (notably Scr 1325 in 2000 
and Scr 1820 in 2008). a focus on the impact of conflict on women, calls 
for their greater participation in peacebuilding as well as combating sexual 
violence in conflict, are framing greater attention to how security risks and 
situations are assessed and how programmes such as SSr and aVr can reflect 
these issues. in 2009, oecd dac added a separate section of guidance on 
“integrating gender awareness and equality” in the widely-used Handbook 
on Security System reform. Such adaptations continue to refine programme 
assessment and design. overall, an aVr-SSr approach encourages a pragmatic 
Box 2.5. Bangladesh: Community consultation process on SALW 
and an SSR programme
What works: Since Small arms and light weapons (SaLw) and improvised explosive 
devices (ieds) are considered an increasing security problem for Bangladesh, the Bangladesh 
national forum against Small arms and the non-governmental organisation (ngo) 
Saferworld undertook an extensive community consultation to identify safety and security 
concerns of communities related to SaLw and ieds. the consultations brought together the 
perspectives of 150 community representatives from 6 districts. they not only highlighted 
the role of SaLw and ieds as a source of human insecurity, but showed that the role of the 
police and border agencies was not always optimal. the border agencies were not able to 
control the trafficking and smuggling of arms whilst law enforcement agencies were in some 
cases a source of firearms. consequently, the recommendations flowing from the consultation 
process involved the strengthening of the capacity of law enforcement agencies for stock-
pile management and the strengthening of the Bangladesh rifles – the agency responsible 
for border management – as well as the customs and immigration agencies. in addition, it 
was stressed that for effective policing (including on SaLw and ied related matters) trust 
between communities and the police is important, and therefore programmes to reinforce 
community policing were recommended.
Why it works: the community-based consultations provided a grassroots perspective on 
SaLw’s impact on human security, generating valuable information for both national and 
international actors trying to develop policies and programmes to address these issues. the 
conclusions from the process highlighted gaps in the security sector and came up with recom-
mendations to solve the challenges. thus, the SaLw consultations led to recommendations 
for a potential SSr approach. moreover, the consultation process allowed local communities 
to engage with issues that were formerly dominated by the state, which is not only important 
in order to find solutions, but also for increasing cooperation between the state, community 
actors and citizens.
Source: national forum against Small arms and Light weapons and Saferworld (2006), Challenges 
to Peace and Security: Consulting Communities on Small Arms in Bangladesh, Saferworld, London.
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and hands-on approach to assessment, where various tools are used flexibly 
to find an appropriate mix of methods for the specific context and are directly 
linked to programme needs, involving programme staff and beneficiaries from 
the outset.
Programme design
Locally focused assessment prompts awareness of community dynamics 
at the earliest phase of programming, during design and planning. including 
a focus on issues highlighted by the aV lens in an SSr assessment and using 
population-based statistics to collect accurate knowledge of incidents and 
types of armed violence can help identify local complexities that need to 
be addressed through SSr programming. when subsequently setting up a 
programme, project coordinators need to ensure that due attention is given to 
each of the issues in the design of the objectives, beneficiaries, indicators for 
monitoring and evaluation and outputs of a programme. incorporating this 
knowledge into design facilitates tailoring programme responses to the local-
level where the impact of violence is often most acute and dynamics are most 
context-specific (moser and mcilwaine, 2006).
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Chapter 3 
 
Synergies between AVR and SSR programming activities
AVR emphasis in SSR
Having used the aV lens and other (combinations of) innovative assess-
ment methods to identify where SSr can be strengthened, the next step is to 
integrate these insights into actual programming activities. as in the example 
of Bangladesh in Box 2.5, applying an aVr focus to a security assessment 
can highlight certain aspects of aVr that need to be effectively addressed in 
table 3.1. Ideas for SSR programme activities with an AVR emphasis
SSR subsector AVR emphasis in SSR
Police Addressing the role of police officers as perpetrators, both towards women and men
Capacity-building on responding to gender-based violence/domestic violence
Capacity-building on addressing youth violence
Capacity-building on monitoring crime and homicide rates
Capacity-building on crime reporting systems and co-operation with public health systems
Defence Addressing the role of (ex-) military as perpetrators both towards women and men
Justice Addressing formal and informal institutions governing gun ownership and violent behaviour
Addressing formal and informal institutions covering the protection of vulnerable groups
Capacity-building to address land disputes
Capacity-building on adjudicating gender-based violence/domestic violence
Capacity-building on adjudicating youth violence 
Civil society Capacity-building on monitoring of armed violence, including violence perpetrated by actors in the 
security system
Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on armed violence, including violence perpetrated 
by actors in the security system
Capacity-building in campaigning and advocacy on gender-based violence/domestic violence
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SSr practice. another clear example of SSr incorporating an aVr empha-
sis is the focus of many police and defence reform programmes on SaLw 
management and disarmament (see for an example in cambodia: Bourne 
and greene, 2004). However, there are many other ways in which an aVr 
emphasis in SSr can enhance the effectiveness of SSr programmes.10 only 
a proper assessment can indicate what form such a synergy should take in a 
specific situation. However, in general, four sub-sectors were found to benefit 
in particular from an aVr emphasis: police reform, defence reform, justice 
reform and civil society. table 3.1. gives a, by no means exhaustive, list of 
ideas for SSr programming with an aVr emphasis in these sectors.
Box 3.1. Colombia: Police reform on domestic violence with a social 
service emphasis
What works: the inter-american development Bank (idB) has recognised 
that domestic violence is a major problem in Latin-america and the caribbean 
and has incorporated it as a focus in their violence reduction programming. 
an example of this can be found in colombia, where the idB’s projects have 
included a focus on improving the interface between the police and victims 
of domestic abuse. to achieve this, the idB projects involved the training of 
police officers on appropriately handling cases of domestic abuse. as part of 
this programme, the idB’s project in Bogotá also involved the establishment of 
“family police stations”. these were multi-services stations that provided vic-
tims of domestic abuse with access to policing, legal, psychological and medi-
cal services in one location. in spite of some room for improvement in terms 
of enforcement and capacity to mediate physical aggression against women, 
the multi-service police stations were rated as “the most helpful public sector 
institution in addressing issues of domestic violence”.
Why it works: the project in Bogotá shows an innovative way of emphasising 
social services as part of a police reform programme. the programme effec-
tively integrated a focus on social assistance for victims of domestic abuse into 
a wider programme to improve police capacity in addressing domestic abuse 
and providing assistance to victims. By setting up multi-disciplinary family 
police stations, the police reform programme explicitly allowed a more holistic, 
multilevel and multi-sectoral approach to the issue of domestic violence.
Source: Alda,	E.,	M.	Buvinić	and	J.	Lamas	(2006),	“Neighbourhood	Peacekeeping:	The	
inter-american development Bank’s Violence reduction programmes in colombia and 
uruguay”, Civil Wars, Vol. 8, no. 2, p. 197-214.
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Complementary AVR and SSR programming
Beyond including due focus on aVr aspects in SSr programmes, syn-
ergies can also be found between concurrent aVr and SSr programmes. 
awareness of the comparative advantages of each approach and the com-
plementarity of these comparative advantages, will ensure that the most 
effective combination between aVr and SSr can be coordinated while rein-
forcing the strength of each programme’s niche activity.
Practically, these comparative advantages can be combined into positive 
synergies in a number of ways, amongst which:
•	 Sequencing of efforts – for example ensuring that SSr programmes 
build on existing aVr initiatives and vice versa. for more informa-
tion see the chapter on entry points (chapter 4).
•	 combining of efforts: SSr programming (for example capacity-
building of the police to address crime) can have a deterrent impact on 
crime, whereas aVr can target risk and protective factors for potential 
perpetrators of that same crime (youth employment schemes, etc.) as 
well as design programmes to incentivise local community members to 
engage in violence reduction (for an example from Haiti, see Box 2.1).
•	 formal and informal institutions: SSr targets more formal institutional 
reforms of the security provision bodies (with some level of attention 
to non-state actors in justice and security). aVr can work in tandem 
on reforming informal institutions (i.e. the practices, norms and values 
that organise social behaviour) connected to violent behaviour.11
•	 table 3.2. gives a few practical suggestions and ideas – by no means 
exhaustive – for complementary SSr and aVr programmes.
table 3.2. Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes
AVR programme SSR programme
Neighbourhood watch groups; citizen emergency 
response teams; community safety initiatives
Community-policing training programmes for police 
forces; public outreach campaigns to increase police 
relations with communities
Mechanisms for anonymous reporting of abuse by 
security forces
Appointing official ombudsman
Gender-sensitive youth programmes to reduce risk of 
recruitment or victimisation
Specialised and gender-sensitive DDR programmes to 
address youth violence; gangs that recognise the distinct 
roles of men and women in conflict and armed violence 
Community disarmament; changing gendered cultural and 
social norms that support weapons possession
SALW stockpile management programmes for police and 
defence forces; DDR programmes for former soldiers
Linking Security SyStem reform and armed VioLence reduction: Programming note – © oecd 2011
34 – 3. SynergieS Between aVr and SSr Programming actiVitieS
another way in which programmes can be mutually sensitive is by 
ensuring communication between the different programmes and the actors 
involved in them. By ensuring that stakeholders in SSr programmes are 
aware of what is happening in aVr programming and vice versa, connec-
tions can be made where necessary.
Supporting local peace councils to resolve non-violent 
disputes 
Capacity building of local justice/mediation systems
Security forums between community and state actors Creating public oversight and accountability mechanisms
Awareness raising campaigns for communities and 
children on mines and unexploded ordnance
 Training of specialist de-mining units
Crime reduction through community development, 
“convivencia” programmes, alcohol reduction programmes
Crime reduction through capacity building of police and 
justice sector to respond to and prosecute crimes and 
assist victims
Rehabilitation projects for perpetrators; development and 
implementation of alternative sentencing programmes
Capacity-building of justice and penal systems to pursue, 
prosecute and sentence perpetrators; implementing 
parole systems or time limits on pre-trial detention to 
reduce prison numbers
Awareness raising campaigns/sensitisation on GBV/
domestic violence; changing gendered cultural and 
social norms that support GBV; assistance programmes 
(shelters and services) for victims of domestic/sexual 
violence
Legal reform on GBV/domestic violence (addressing 
formal institutions); capacity-building of security 
institutions on gender and procedures for dealing with 
victims of GBV; ensuring fair representation of men and 
women in the security bodies 
Care for youth involved in violence or substance abuse; 
campaigning to change social norms and mindsets that 
contribute to youth violence
Capacity-building of police, justice and prison sectors on 
addressing youth violence, prosecution and incarceration
table 3.2. Ideas for complementary AVR and SSR programmes  (continued)
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Box 3.2. Skopje: Combining an existing SSR programme 
with a new AVR initiative
What works: the community of old town, in Skopje, macedonia, suffered 
from high levels of pick-pocketing and theft, drug dealing, prostitution, armed 
robberies and assault. the police were perceived as weak and distrust of the 
police was high. with international support a bike police unit was established, 
but this proved ineffective. in this context, Saferworld, with a local partner, 
implemented a community safety programme, starting by having 9 focus group 
meetings with different community stakeholders to identify priorities in their 
security concerns. an “action working group on Safety and Security in the 
Skopje old town (awg)” involving representatives of a community ngo, the 
municipality, the local police station, the police bike team and the local busi-
ness association was set up to address the priorities. in consultation with the 
police the awg identified a way to restructure the organisational set-up of the 
police station so that more patrols could take place at no additional cost. at the 
same time, several community actions were taken to address crime, including 
removing stalls from illegal vendors that narrowed passage ways, installing 
anonymous crime reporting boards and the hiring of a private security group 
as an additional crime deterrent measure. the combinations of measures led to 
a modest decrease in recorded criminal incidents, including armed violence.
Why it works: the approach started by identifying priorities by community 
members themselves. it then involved all relevant stakeholders, including 
representatives from existing police stations and earlier reform projects in the 
working group to carry out the action plan. this ensured easy and quick com-
munication with the relevant institutions. it also seems to have allowed for 
smooth connections to existing programmes, and for addressing both the formal 
institutional level and community level activities.
Source: Saferworld (2006), Creating Safer Communities: Lessons from South Eastern 
Europe, Saferworld, London.
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Chapter 4 
 
Entry points
SSR as an entry point for AVR
in some cases, governments may be wary of local level interventions and 
will want to control interventions closely. this is especially the case in situa-
tions of internal conflict where the government is fighting one or more rebel 
groups, as for example in Sri Lanka. in such cases, the government may be 
more open to discussions on institutional reform of the security institutions 
than on discussions of broader aVr involving communities. once these 
reforms are initiated, efforts can be made to open up discussions with the 
national authorities and advocate for complementary aVr programming. a 
particular opportunity for this can be found when institutional and techni-
cal approaches fall short of expected results. this can be the case when an 
SSr programme is not able to address the security needs of communities as 
experienced on the ground. an example of this can be found in Haiti, where 
initial programmes by the un heavily targeted institutional capacity but, in 
light of the limited effectiveness, evolved into more community-based aVr 
programmes.12 also in cases where SSr programmes are in fact yielding 
good results, additional aVr programmes can be particularly reinforcing and 
complementary, as in many cases where small arms reduction and legislation 
efforts have formed part of SSr programming.
AVR as an entry point for SSR
circumstances common to fragile contexts, in which the state is unable 
or unwilling to effectively deliver security, justice and other services to all 
its citizens, can critically hinder the practical implementation of SSr. in 
such a situation, an SSr approach may not be the most appropriate entry 
point for programming, given that working with state institutions is very dif-
ficult and likely to be ineffective in increasing the delivery of security and 
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justice services to the local population. an extreme example of this situation 
is Somalia. under this type of condition, it may be more effective to start 
with community based aVr programmes, which, besides more immediately 
addressing justice and security needs at the local level, can also provide an 
opening for SSr programming at a later stage.
Similarly, this approach can be taken where state institutions are abu-
sive and/or where there is a large amount of distrust amongst the population 
towards them. Building local level security initiatives as well as working with 
local/non-state security and justice actors13 can provide a basis for discussing 
reforms of the security institutions and foster the population’s trust required 
to enhance governance in areas where the state previously had no access.
another way that aVr can facilitate the introduction of SSr programmes 
is by virtue of its people-centred focus, evidence driven methods and advo-
cacy work. for example, the aV lens for people and perpetrators may prompt 
investigations into corruption, weakness, or abuse within one or several of the 
state security sectors. if evidence can be substantiated, presenting this infor-
mation to local governments or international donors may help to mobilise the 
political support needed for implementing SSr programmes (for an example 
from Sierra Leone, see Box 2.4).
Box 4.1. Community security teams in Cali: An AVR entry point 
for community policing reform
What works: in cali, colombia, youth community Security teams (cSts) were set up to 
provide basic security for neighbourhoods that were considered too dangerous for policing 
patrols to enter. the cSts were given organisational support as well as training in first aid and 
personal security by a local community peace council (deSePaZ). after cSts were accepted 
and legitimised by the community, cooperation with the local police was initiated through 
community-policing reform and formal law enforcement could gradually be reintroduced.
Why it works: Success in this case was attributed to the ability of the cSts to improve 
security conditions, garner the community’s support and initiate a more positive relation-
ship between the local police and the local people. Building this rapport principally requires 
that state security forces become familiar with local programmes and explore the benefits of 
co-operation. Similarly, it is necessary for community-based projects to establish an organi-
sational structure conducive to partnering with local authorities or (inter)national security 
forces operating in the area.
Source: Hill, r., J. temin and L. Pacholek (2007), “Building Security where there is no Security”, 
Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, Vol. 3, no. 2, p. 38-51.
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Chapter 5 
 
Monitoring and evaluation
monitoring and evaluation (m&e) is the practice of tracking the progress 
of a programme, determining what changes it has brought about and gauging 
the greater implications of those outcomes. aVr and SSr each make distinct 
contributions to m&e, which reflect their particular approaches to estab-
lishing security and stability. aVr emphasises the role of the local context 
and people, particularly in developing m&e indicators (oecd, 2009, p. 73). 
SSr’s treatment of m&e is oriented toward programme management, par-
ticularly as a tool for process appraisal and adjustment (oecd, 2007, p. 71). 
the contributions of each primarily fall within: (a) developing indicators and 
(b) involving local stakeholders.
Developing indicators
within m&e, indicators are precise descriptions of evidence that can 
measure the level of change brought about by a programme. identifying 
indicators at the planning stage helps to clarify project objectives and enables 
baseline assessment, which allows a programme’s progress and impact to be 
measured against initial conditions. the SSr Handbook suggests evaluation 
criteria that follow general oecd standards for assessing development pro-
grammes, broken down into the following categories: relevance, effective-
ness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. additionally, a description is 
given on important characteristics of indicators, such as measurability, con-
text-specificity, clarity and feasibility (oecd, 2007, p. 72). the aVr policy 
paper contributes insight on adapting indicators to local levels and specific 
projects (oecd, 2009 p. 73). when designing indicators, the complementa-
rity of these approaches highlights a focus on, among others:
•	 what indicators best reflect manifestations of violence as experienced 
by local men and women, boys and girls
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•	 which manifestations of violence can be realistically targeted; which 
are beyond the reasonable scope of the programmes’ impact
•	 what local behaviours can be used to indicate popular attitudes, 
beliefs and/or perceptions; how might those behaviours vary between 
different impacted groups
•	 what indicators are specific to the micro-level and thereby offer more 
acute evidence for the impact of a specific programme at the local level
•	 what existing data sources (i.e. school attendance records, medical 
clinic records) could supply relevant information without having to 
develop new monitoring systems
Involving local stakeholders: Ownership and frontline capacities
developing locally attuned indicators opens a valuable opportunity to 
include local stakeholders in the early stages of programme design, ensuring 
that expectations are realistic and fostering a common vision of success held 
by the donor, recipient state and communities. while both SSr and aVr 
note the importance of involving local partners, their reasons for doing so 
reflect their distinct approaches. SSr emphasises the participation of local 
stakeholders in programme evaluations as part and parcel of building both 
local ownership and state-society relations within the partner country (oecd, 
2007, p. 242). aVr accentuates how local participation in m&e enables 
programmes to access local insight and capitalise on the rooted position of 
community members for rapid monitoring and response. moreover, including 
local stakeholders in the development of benchmarks and indicators increases 
the capacity of the community for research and advocacy (oecd, 2009, p. 73). 
this can fortify longer-term civil society oversight of the security forces, 
which contributes to the sustainability of reforms in the security system.
developing local knowledge and skill in systematic data collection, 
recording and reporting, as well as data analysis for m&e on issues of secu-
rity and armed violence (with a gender focus) are just a few examples of how 
donors can effectively partner with local actors whilst encouraging local 
ownership and increasing long-term sustainability. what is more, implement-
ing ongoing local monitoring programmes can work as an early warning 
system and improve the level of knowledge on issues such as corruption. 
this could enable local partners, given their frontline proximity, to engage in 
rapid-response and preventative activities.
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Box 5.1. Mali: Participatory monitoring and evaluation
What works: citing the critical need to recognise the value of local perceptions, the united 
nations institute for disarmament research (unidir) conducted a study highlighting the 
benefits of participatory monitoring and evaluation (Pm&e) approaches. Premised on the 
idea that positive outcomes must be apparent to the affected communities in order for disar-
mament campaigns to be successful, unidir applied Pm&e to assess the local impact of a 
weapons collection programme in mali. community members and programme beneficiaries 
identified a range of indicators that they felt were relevant to and significant of the pro-
gramme’s outcomes. these indicators, often qualitative, described observable behaviours that 
local stakeholders used to assess, inter alia, security and the restoration of social capital in 
their community. this was presented as an alternative to applying pre-determined, and often 
strictly quantitative, indicators – such as number of weapons collected – which do not always 
reflect local standards of success.
Why it works: Pm&e was applied to create monitoring practices that emphasise how local 
stakeholders perceive their situation and the programme. given that m&e indicators often 
receive a great deal of attention from donors and practitioners, including accurate portrayals 
of local expectations and assessments in m&e criteria can allay conflicting interpretations 
of success between local and foreign stakeholders. the study elicited several indicators of 
how a particular community defined security, how they understood the disarmament pro-
gramme and how they believed they could contribute to it. Such information could also work 
to manage expectations, encourage sustained monitoring from the ground, as well as bolster 
local ownership by providing clear and concrete venues for local input.
Source: mugumya, g. (2004), Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: weapons collection 
programmes assessed by local people, unidir (united nations institute for disarmament research), 
geneva.; muggah, r. (2005a), Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluation of DDR and Arms 
Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania, unidir, geneva.
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Notes
1. in keeping with the oecd terminology and definitions, this paper will use the 
term Security System reform, however it is recognised that this is not the only 
term used to refer to SSr-style programming. other terms include, amongst 
others, Security Sector reform, Security and Justice reform (SJr), Security Sector 
development (SSd) and sometimes rule of Law programming. although the term 
used in this paper is Security System reform, the paper’s ideas are equally appli-
cable to other programmes with similar objectives, regardless of the terminology.
2. chapter 7 of the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (oecd, 
2007) discusses programming for each of the sectors and indicates, per sector, 
the relevant linkages with other sectors of the security system, which need to 
be considered in programming. Please refer to this chapter for a more detailed 
explanation of the various programmatic options. 
3. children and youth form a particularly important category for aVr program-
ming. for more information on programming for youth violence reduction pro-
gramming, see the oecd’s programming note on this. 
4. one clear example is the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007).
5. in that sense, SSr can be seen as a statebuilding effort, as “it attempts to rein-
force the positive reciprocal relations between a state that delivers services for 
its people and social and political groups who constructively engage with their 
state” (wyeth and Sisk, 18 June 2009, p. 5, citing oecd (2008), Statebuilding in 
Situations of Fragility: Initial Findings). 
6. in that sense, aVr could be considered a peacebuilding approach, which 
“involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing 
into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict manage-
ment and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development” (wyeth 
and Sisk, 18 June, 2009, p.5, citing Conceptual basis for peacebuilding for the 
UN system adopted by the Secretary-general’s Policy committee, may 2007). 
However, aVr is broader than peacebuilding, in that it addresses many more fac-
tors than the national capacities at all levels for conflict management. 
7. However, an aVr approach in assessments should not replace existing assessment 
methodologies. rather, it can help draw together several assessment methodologies 
and make assessments and hence programming more sensitive to armed violence. 
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for a more detailed explanation, see: “chapter 4: assessments: applying the 
armed Violence Lens” (oecd, 2009). 
8. an example from colombia demonstrates how the correlation between armed 
violence and alcohol consumption led to municipal restrictions on liquor sales, 
which is purported to have effectively reduced homicide rates (atwood, glatz 
and muggah, 2006, p.26).
9. the public health approach involves a very technical form of research, requir-
ing specialised training in data collection, survey design, sampling techniques, 
and statistical analysis. contracting assessment projects to epidemiologists – 
particularly those familiar with conflict research – or including them as part of 
assessment teams and programme staff can facilitate this process. for further 
discussion, see: thoms and ron (2008).
10. another example of an integration of an aVr emphasis in a police reform pro-
gramme can be found in the community Based Policing programme in kenya. 
for more information on this, see: Saferworld (2008), Implementing Community-
Based Policing in Kenya, Saferworld, London. 
11. for examples of how informal institutions can be addressed, see: wHo (2009b).
12. undP ddr 3rd Quarterly report cites Sc/reS/1702 (2006) which “recognises 
the limitations of a ddr approach... and further recognises the role of the com-
munity in preparing the republic of Haiti for gradual withdrawal of [Peace 
keeping operations]... this resolution is the successful outcome of a long and 
tough struggle undertaken by the ddr integrated Section since mid-2005, 
advocating that...an innovative strategy with a strong focus on ‘putting weapons 
beyond use in the context of community security approach’ must be developed.” 
(undP, 2006).
13. for a discussion of the policy and conceptual issues involved in working with 
local/non-state justice and security actors, see: Scheye (2009b).
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